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Progressive
FAILURE
One of the mainstays of 'progressive' education doctrines 
over the last twenty years has been a firm opposition to 
academic selection in schools. Ian Hunter argues that this 
stance is misconceived. He contends that there are sound 
social democratic reasons for selection, and for the 
meritocratic ethos associated with it...
he role of the education system in 
assessing students and selecting 
them for different and unequal social 
destinations is one that causes many 
teachers and administrators a good deal of worry. 
This worry has a weak and a strong form. The 
weak form is a concern that the procedures of 
assessment and selection are not fulfilling their 
technical ends; for example, because they are as­
sessing students on the basis of inherited cultural 
style rather than trained scholastic abilities.
Often people who worry in this way seek simply to purge 
such procedures of traces of irrational social biases and 
values—and this seems to me an appropriate and routine 
professional concern. The strong form of this worry,
though, is quite another matter. It is an anxiety about 
scholastic assessment and social selection as such, no mat­
ter how explicit or rational. This anxiety is typically ex­
pressed in the language of cultural egalitarianism and 
democratic rights. Here the fear is that in assessing and 
selecting students for their social and occupational futures, 
educators may be falling short of a higher goal: the com­
plete development of students as human beings. This ar­
ticle is intended as a small contribution towards a therapy 
for this anxiety.
I want to give below some historical and theoretical reasons 
for thinking that this 'higher goal' is meaningless in the 
context of modem education systems. I will suggest that 
the ranking and social selection of students is a fundamen­
tal function of such systems; that this function is com­
patible with at least one social-democratic conception of 
social justice; and that the overwhelming majority of 
professional educators is quite properly committed to a
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continual refining of this function and the meritocratic 
ethos associated with it.
The following remarks by Bill Hannan—taken from an 
essay entitled 'Universal Schooling Should Qualify 
Universally'—neatly encapsulate the anxiety over social 
selection that dominated progressive educational thinking 
in the 1970s and 1980s.
If schooling aims to provide an adequate preparation 
for professional training (1 use professional to mean 
any productive work) and for responsible cultural 
participation, then democratic schooling should aim 
to provide this double preparation for everybody.
The most obvious corollary of this is that universal 
schooling should provide a qualification adequate to 
any kind of job training.
For Hannan, writing as a leading figure in the Victorian 
Secondary Teachers Association and as the Executive Of­
ficer of the Victorian Curriculum Advisory Board, equality 
of opportunity is inseparable from equality of outcome. 
Any process of education that ends in the grading and 
selection of students has been 'trivialised', diverted from 
its true goal of realising the inner potential of the individual 
student.
By way of contrast we can look at some remarks on the 
same theme made by the British political sociologist T H 
Marshall in his celebrated essay 'Citizenship and Social 
Class'. In Marshall's account the function of social selec­
tion, while a relatively recent historical phenomenon, is 
one of the fundamental and defining features of modem 
education systems and—under his meritocratic interpreta­
tion—a source of legitimacy rather than anxiety.
The right of the citizen in this process of selection and 
mobility is the right of equality of opportunity. Its 
aim is to eliminate hereditary privilege. In essence it 
is the equal right to display and develop differences, 
or inequalities; the equal right to be recognised as 
unequal...the final outcome is a structure of unequal 
status fairly apportioned to unequal abilities. The 
process is sometimes associated with ideas of laissez 
faire individualism, but within the educational sys­
tem it is a matter, not of laissez faire, but of planning.
The process through which abilities are revealed, the 
influences to which they are subjected, the tests by 
which they are measured, and the rights given as a 
result of the tests are all planned.
The difference between these two conceptions of equality 
of opportunity—for Hannan it means equality of qualifica­
tion, while for Marshall it is the 'equal right to be recog­
nised as unequal'—is clear. The line of demarcation runs 
much deeper than this, though. For Hannan the education 
system is (or should be) a vehicle for the cultural develop­
ment of humanity; for Marshall it is an instrument of social 
administration.
A good deal of thinking about education takes place in the 
space defined by the contrast between Marshall and Han­
nan. Perhaps its most distinctive and worrying feature is 
the difficult and ambiguous manner in which this sort of V~ o  c. c. o  . "F ^
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thinking distinguishes between the meritocratic and the 
egalitarian, between the process of social selection and the 
goal of complete development. It is often unclear, for ex­
ample, whether criticisms of assessment and selection pro­
cedures are driven by the weak or strong form of the 
concern noted above; that is, whether their objective is to 
improve these procedures in the name of the 'equal right 
to be recognised as unequal', or to abolish them in the name 
of a right to 'a qualification adequate to any kind of job 
training'.
The same ambiguity regarding the scope and form of 
educational reform pervades much of the work done in the 
1970s and 80s on the theme of educational inequality and 
the notion of ability. The value of this work is, it seems to 
me, unquestionable. It shows statistical correlations be­
tween the inequality of educational outcomes and ine­
qualities in students' social origins. Sometimes it goes 
further in suggesting that the responsibility for this cor­
relation lies with schools which test students for aptitudes 
acquired outside the school environment, and in particular 
for what is sometimes called 'cultural capital'—aptitudes 
derived from privileged social backgrounds.
The interesting thing about these findings, however, is that 
in principle they are compatible with both Marshall's and 
Hannan's positions—but only under different interpreta­
tions and oriented to different ends. From Marshall's 
perspective...the link between educational outcomes and 
students' social backgrounds is an indication of the dis­
tance that the education system has still to travel to reach 
its meritocratic objective: to detach the unequal outcomes 
of education from inherited inequalities of status and pres­
tige, and to link them instead to unequal scholastic perfor­
mance. For Hannan, though, the same findings have a 
quite different significance. The linkage of different ability 
levels to unequal social outcomes is unacceptable per se:
All selective devices of the HSC [the old Victorian 
Higher School Certificate] or aptitude test kind 
imply that some are more entitled to privilege than 
others, and they will continue to do so as long as 
higher education continues to admit people to 
privileged positions. I don't think anyone bothers to 
deny this. On the contrary, it is offered as the reason 
for remaining exclusive—that the prospect of 
privilege must irresistibly attract the most talented.
So, because I want to argue against education's being 
thus identified with social privilege, I must argue 
against all selective devices based on academic merit 
however that may be measured.
Not all progressive educationists, however, are as uncom­
promising as Hannan appears to be. Typically, those who 
point to the links between unequal social backgrounds and 
unequal educational outcomes do not specify which of the 
two interpretations governs their analysis. Is the link an 
indication that any education system that selects students 
for unequal social destinations is intrinsically unjust—so 
that the very notion of different ability levels is an ideologi­
cal mask for the reproduction of class differences? Or is it 
a sign that more needs to be done to detach the formation 
and assessment of scholastic aptitudes from social origins,
before the unequal rewards of education become socially 
just?
In fact, this is something about which Hannan himself is 
uncertain. Indeed, his apparently uncompromising last 
quotation continues by hesitating between precisely these 
two interpretations: "I would prefer to argue that a just 
society would not countenance or cultivate privilege, but 
at the very least, I would argue that education in a just 
society should not be tied to the prevailing system of social 
privilege".
To oscillate between the abolition and the reform of the 
system of social selection is no small ambivalence. This 
ambiguity, which has deep historical and social roots, is a 
source of significant instability and incoherence in public 
thinking about education. As Hannan comments, no-one 
denies that in the actually existing education system 
scholastic assessment functions to select students for une­
qual social destinations. Yet a significant number of 
teachers and administrators claim to reject this function in 
the name of universal qualification. In the case of ad­
ministrators this amounts to a disavowal of the system 
whose conscientious supervision remains their profes­
sional responsibility.
Of course, this professional responsibility is disavowed 
only in the name of a higher calling. Progressive officials 
see their conduct as governed by the demands of cultural 
equality and social justice. Yet there are, I would argue, 
prima facie grounds for doubting the adequacy of this 
self-perceived role. In the first place, it ignores the fact that 
in speaking for 'the equal right to be recognised as 
unequal', Marshall is also speaking in the name of social 
justice. Marshall is not defending scholastic ability testing 
in the name of 'excellence' or 'cultural standards' but as a 
(admittedly imperfect) means of eliminating 'hereditary 
privilege' from the legitimately unequal distribution of 
'social rights' presided over by the school system. Second, 
it is not at all clear that the goal governing progressivist 
proposals to 'democratise' education—the goal of univer­
sal qualification—is practicable or indeed makes sense 
within the values and structures of historically existing 
school systems. If this is the case, then the disavowal of 
professional responsibility for the administration of this 
system—purportedly at the behest of a higher democratic 
calling—may very well simply mean a rejection of the very 
values and techniques that give legitimacy to the profes­
sional conduct of educationists.
It is not difficult to detect the point at which progressive 
officials disavow the system that they help administer. It 
occurs when an intellectual and ethical commitment is 
made to an educational process that is held to be more 
fundamental, broader, less utilitarian, or more organic 
than the actual methods of the historically existing school 
system. Since the Romantics the notion of 'culture' has 
signified the idea that human beings are formed by a wider 
process of 'education' far more profound than anything 
achieved by mere school systems. And insofar as they 
invoke this process as the basis of a fundamental critique 
of the school system, progressive officials are adopting the 
oppositionalist ethic of the 'cultural intellectual'. It is only
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against the backdrop of this commitment to culture that 
Hannan can denounce the artificial character of mere 
'schooling'.
Education is a quality to which every person is born. 
From their first observable moments, people learn. In 
their first few years, they learn prodigiously. I believe 
in their unalterable right to preserve the extraordi­
nary gifts they are born with, but I observe that our 
society, mainly through its schools, often deprives 
them of it by making them dependent on school-con­
cocted substitutes...[and ultimately] to a certificate 
that is given or withheld for the sake of a single mark 
in several hundred.
In Hannan's case this critique has, as this quotation indi­
cates, an individualist and humanist character. But this is 
not its essential feature. Hannan sees culture as residing in 
the untutored child. Yet others, ostensibly more sociologi­
cal and historical, equally easily locate it in the working 
class, Third World peasants, women—in short, in any 
group whose moral aura makes it into a plausible bearer of 
that supposedly 'organic' or 'authentic' process of develop­
ment which, we are told, lies beneath the planned process 
of development administered by the school system.
Professional responsibility is 
disavowed in the name of a 
higher calling
Let me summarise my argument so far. In pledging them­
selves to 'culture', cultural intellectuals make a moral com­
m itment to an idea of human developm ent which 
disregards specific social purposes and techniques, and 
which sees itself as 'complete'. This is the notion of the free 
realisation of human capacities that in Western thought, 
since at least the time of Kant, has been identified with 
moral perfection. What the idea offers to its adherents is an 
image of the unity and universality of the perfected human 
person, perhaps already glimpsed but certainly promised 
as the reward of the long march of human history.
In its original form, this image of complete human develop­
ment was the goal of a secularised spiritual discipline 
practised by the caste of humanist intellectuals. Since Hegel 
and Marx, however, cultural intellectuals have increasing­
ly sought to identify the goal of this particular caste practice 
with the ultimate purpose of humanity. However, this 
overreaching generalisation has seriously impaired the 
public understanding of educational and other social sys­
tems. It has convinced a stratum of cultural intellectuals 
that they possess a general theory of politics and society, 
and that the forms of thought and development charac­
teristic of their particular sphere of ethical self-cultivation 
can be applied to a quite different department of existence: 
the government of the modem nation state—and, in par­
ticular, the school system as an agency for this form of 
government.
I have formulated the issue in this somewhat roundabout 
way in order to pre-empt a particular understanding of the 
situation. It is often held that this goal of complete human 
development represents an ideal that the actually existing 
school system can be condemned (or praised) for ap­
proximating to some degree. I want to suggest, on the 
contrary, that this image of complete human development, 
far from being a universal truth, is itself merely a mundane 
reality in a department of existence (humanist ethics) 
which, while connected to the ethos of the modem school 
system, possesses no inherent ethical superiority over it. If 
this is the case then the claim that TJniversal schooling 
should qu alify  u n iversally ' ind icates a serious 
misunderstanding of the organisation, character and func­
tions of modem school systems. Cultural intellectuals con­
demn such systems for their alleged 'failure' to achieve the 
complete development of the person. The argument I have 
sketched here might suggest, on the contrary, a failure on 
the part of the cultural intellectuals and progressive offi­
cials to understand the distinctions between the different 
departments of existence traversed in the course of their 
own personal and public lives.
Needless to say here I am only sketching the outline of an 
argument towards such conclusions. Nonetheless there are 
several key features of modem school systems that might 
render such an argument plausible. The following sum­
mary of these features is offered as goad to further debate.
i) The limited and particular character o f human capacities and 
rights. This is partly a question of which end of the historical 
telescope one looks down. Looked at from the end of the 
cultural intellectual, the capacities and rights made avail­
able by modem school systems can never be anything more 
than fragments of the complete set promised by 'authentic' 
cultural development.
Seen from M arshall's perspective, however, these 
capacities and rights represent important instruments for 
making more homogeneous the previously disparate 
modes of existence and social strata of pre-modern 
societies. According to Marshall, pre-administrative 
societies are characterised by disparate social strata whose 
unconnected ways of living give them the character of 
'islands' of ethical, social and political existence. It is 
anachronistic to call such societies unequal, for there is as 
yet no common standard of living against which ine­
qualities might be registered. When such a standard does 
start to emerge, according to Marshall, it is not from a single 
general source or along a single line of historical develop­
ment ('culture'). Instead it emerges in a piecemeal fashion 
as a result of the historical expansion of specific forms of 
social administration: the common law system (civil 
rights); the parliamentary-electoral system (political 
rights); the welfare system (social rights). These systems 
penetrate those previously discrete islands of social exist­
ence, joining their inhabitants via the device of stand­
ardised rights and capacities, and creating the possibility 
for new kinds of equality and inequality to emerge against 
the backdrop of a common standard of living.
This account doesn't conceive of these different lines of 
development meeting at the end of history in a form of a
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complete, fulfilled humanity. On the contrary, the different 
rights, and their different logics, may often cross-cut and 
contradict each other. It is meaningless, therefore, to expect 
such a system to promote equal access to a complete set of 
human capacities or to condemn it for 'failing7 to do so.
ii) The governmental function o f modern school systems. 
Modem school systems are the instruments of a particular 
type of political administration. Yet, ironically, this fun­
damentally political character of modem education sys­
tems has been obscured by forms of thinking whose official 
objective has been to uncover a 'hidden' politics of educa­
tion—a way of thinking common to Marxism and to the 
culturist approach, both of which tend to reduce the opera­
tion of school systems to the reflection of social processes 
operating elsewhere.
But the politically organised school systems that emerged 
in late eighteenth-century Germany and early nineteenth- 
century England were at once too historically specific and 
too self-contained to fit passively into this model of educa­
tion in society. The idea that national populations should 
be educated, and that this was a task for the state, emerged 
not from the grand dialectic of culture and class but from 
the political and intellectual techniques of a new type of 
national government. Thinkers such as Michel Foucault 
have located these techniques in the systems of state 
policymaking, social statistics, economic management and 
social discipline that emerged in various eighteenth and 
nineteenth-century states. It was inside these new ad­
ministrative environments and mentalities that education 
systems were conceived as instruments for the administra­
tive creation of literate, healthy, productive, orderly and 
useful populations. In short, the objectives of modem 
school systems—at first the social disciplining of chaotic 
populations, and later the training and selection of groups 
for specialised social and economic roles—are the essen­
tially political creation of the systems of administration 
that characterise the modem governmental state.
iii) The technical character o f educational thinking and organisa­
tion. Sophisticated modem school systems appeared first 
not in liberal-democratic states but in the absolutist Ger­
man states, pre-eminently in Prussia. Moreover, when a 
partly democratic state like Britain began to implement 
such systems in the first half of the nineteenth century it 
did so not as a result of popular democratic pressure but 
through the actions of an elite—an elite concerned to com­
bine administrative expertise and a pastoral concern for the 
population.
Whether in democratic or non-democratic states, modern 
education systems treat national populations not as the 
possessors of political rights but as the objects of planned 
care and attention. When progressive educationists 
propose to 'democratise' the school system they typically 
have one or both of two interrelated strategies in view. 
They may aim to bring the structure and logic of schooling 
within the sphere of popular control (through voting or 
collective decision-making) so that the population may 
rationally decide its own cultural formation. Alternatively, 
they may aim to treat the social qualifications unequally 
distributed by schools as democratic rights open to all,
usually by abandoning ranked assessment and attempting 
to isolate schools from occupational and higher academic 
selection processes.
Two features of the technical character of educational 
thinking and decision-making suggest that such strategies 
are at least impracticable and possibly meaningless. First, 
when the early educational administrators took up their 
positions they did not do so as representatives of Locke's 
'rational man'—that is to say, as people in possession of a 
universal faculty of reason which would enable them to 
share that expertise and authority with the whole popula­
tion. Rather, they did so, we have already noted, as the 
exponents of a specialised set of political and intellectual 
techniques. There is no reason to think that these techni­
ques might be appropriately vested in collective com­
munity decision-making.
Modern school systems ore 
the political creations of the 
modern state
Second, the technical organisation of the school system 
means that the social rights and capacities it engenders 
belong to a different sphere of reality to the political rights 
engendered by the parliamentary political system. The 
techniques utilised by the school system are intended to 
enable children to internalise standards of social deport­
ment and scholastic performance. While the national dis­
tribution of these standards creates a new uniformity for 
personhood, their technical effect is to create a far more 
sensitive and sophisticated registration of differences. The 
social and scholastic abilities formed by the modem school 
system are thus differentiated and unequal; the right they 
confer, in Marshall's words, is 'the equal right to be recog­
nised as unequal'. School systems in social democratic 
states thus obtain their legitimacy not by promising equal 
outcomes but by aiming to free the distribution of social 
rights from earlier systems based on the transmission of 
inherited cultural and economic wealth.
(iv) The ambivalence of progressivist educational policy. Work­
ing with their hands on the levers of social differentiation 
and their eyes on the image of complete development, it is 
hardly surprising that progressive o fficia ls have 
developed policy initiatives characterised by a deep am­
bivalence. Indeed, this ambivalence is responsible for the 
most remarkable feature of public educational debate: its 
unstable—in some cases almost schizoid—oscillation be­
tween technical planning and cultural critique, between 
administrative engagement and aesthetic disavowal.
Consider some of the more notable recent policy initiatives 
in Australian secondary school systems. Two interrelated 
developments stand out in particular: the move to treat 
secondary education as a 'phase in its own right' by disen­
gaging it from the selection requirements of universities
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and the credentialling requirements of occupations; and the 
development of non-competitive descriptive student 
profiles, as a substitute for graded assessment structures. 
For their proponents these developments are the expres­
sion of an egalitarian humanism, and signify the opening 
up of culture to the people and the return of the education 
system to democratic control. This is the way Hannan 
interprets such policies—which he has helped to imple­
ment in the new Victorian VCE.
As I see it, the argument against 'grading' is that 
selective schooling, which is necessarily competitive 
and hierarchical (with a strong social class bias), is in 
contradiction to democratic schooling. Democratic 
schooling, by definition, opens up a certain range of 
cultural awareness and control to the whole people. 
Selective schooling reserves access to this same 
knowledge to certain groups. Grading comes into the 
argument because various techniques of grading 
schools or students are the institutional way of being 
socially and culturally selective.
It is not difficult to show that this interpretation of the new
Slides does not take us very far into their reality. In the st place, as technical modifications to a system of govern­
ment it is clear that such policies will not and cannot be 
implemented by popular plebiscite. And indeed at this 
point the 'progressive' side of the progressive official 
abruptly drops from sight and we are confronted by an 
unelected functionary enforcing expert policy via ad­
m inistrative fiat. The change in Hannan's political 
demeanour is quite startling:
What we should be working at now is outlawing 
graded assessments in the period of compulsory 
schooling. It is not enough, in my opinion, to advocate 
school based decision-making with the pious expec­
tation that school communities will make selfless, 
democratic decisions. Some decisions must be con­
strained by public policy.
In fact the arguments I have assembled here go to support 
Hannan's last statement. Non-elected experts and officials 
must indeed make decisions for populations in complex 
govemmentally administered nation states. It is self-delud- 
ing, however, to call these 'democratic decisions', or to 
imagine that'under such circumstances administrators 
speak for the 'Whole people' in some higher sense. In other 
words, the policy of non-graded non-selective assessments 
is 'democratic' only in the imagination of the cultural 
critics, where it signifies equal access to complete develop­
ment. As a technical modification to a technical system of 
cultural formation, however, it is in fact incapable of 
democratic decision and control.
It is not, then, the non-democratic character of this policy 
that is a problem. What is a problem is that the progressive 
official should daim a democratic mandate for his or her 
initiative while simultaneously insisting that, as a matter of 
'public policy7, it cannot be left to the dedsion of school 
communities.
This suggests some of the dangers inherent in the position 
of progressivist officialdom. In daiming their mandate
from an insubstantial 'democratic culture', progressive o f­
ficials disavow the very constraints capable of rendering 
their conduct legitimate and responsible: the constraints of 
technical and ethical competence imposed by membership 
of a profession.
In short, the Romantic-democratic critique of the actual 
school system leads many educational professionals into a 
delusive understanding of their dvic role. However, it also 
has a more practical effect—it leaves their public intellec­
tual conduct lacking in restraint and consistency. The un­
stable compound of cultural critique and technical 
expertise from which educational progressives shape their 
sodal personalities often leads to moral self-aggrandise­
ment and dvic irresponsibility.
Perhaps it is unfair to recall that during the 1970s Hannan 
used the pages of the VSTA's offidal journal to advocate 
repladng the Victorian Higher School Certificate with a 
ballot for university places. Still, this proposal cannot be 
treated as pure jeux d'esprit. It is after all quite consistent 
with a particular interpretation and use of the system of 
non-graded descriptive student profiles—an interpretation 
which treats the non-graded system as a means of evading 
the processes of academic selection.
The technique of descriptive student profiles is not, how­
ever, lim ited to this cu lturalist in terpretation . In 
Queensland, for instance, this technique has been used to 
refine the system of graded assessment and sodal selection 
to very different ends. In this use, descriptive profiling is 
used to identify a distinctive capadty for a particular 
professional vocation. The intention here is not to disavow 
the ranking of abilities in the name of complete human 
development; rather it is to clarify the standards of ability 
involved in this process with a view to purging those not 
dearly transmitted by the school system.
This professional objective (imperfectly realised as it is) 
leads towards the realisation of a sodal right—not the right 
of equal access to complete human development, but the 
right of students to attain unequal sodal and occupational 
status on the basis of demonstrated differences in their 
scholastic abilities.
Few educational professionals would disagree with this 
description of the role of the actually existing education 
system. Many, however, are anxious that this role, and the 
rights it confers, are at best a partial realisation, and at worst 
a complete debasement, of the ideal of complete human 
development which they mostly continue to hold dear.
I've tried to argue here that the use of this ideal as the basis 
for a critique of the school system is always practically 
ineffective, and often self-delusive. In doing so I hope to 
have provided some degree of therapy for this anxiety.
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